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T HE 52 nations meeting at the Chicago Aviation Conference in 1944,
. the last Winter of World War 11, were confronted with the com-
manding fact that global conflict had thrust aviation into a new era of
world-wide dimensions, unparalleled in the past, and the unprecedented
progress of the war years prophesied continual and ever increasing
change in the post-war period. The Conference, one of the earliest
efforts in international planning emerging from this second World War,
thus faced a double task - the achievement of a basic agreement on
international civil aviation principles suitable to the new international
environment and the creation of an institution which could evolve and
whose technical standards could be amended consonant with the antici-
pated expansion in this highly technical field, latent with national polit-
ical and economic implications.
The Chicago Conference's attention was centered primarily on the
basic conflict between the British and American views on the economic
regulations of air transport.' The British conceived of the ultimate
goal of international aviation planning as the control of competition
between states by an international organization. The American posi-
tion was predicated on the principle of removal of state restrictions on
international flight, so that aviation might expand beyond national
boundaries unfettered by the doctrine of air sovereignty. Compromise
proving impossible in 1944, the Chicago conferees tended to observe
the traditional approach that international organizations should func-
tion primarily as coordinating and advisory bodies, with states retain-
ing freedom of action in all matters not specifically restricted by any
of the Convention covenants.
1 See J. C. Cooper, Internationalization of Air Transport, 2 Air Affairs 546
(1949); T. Burke, Influences Affecting International Aviation Policy, 11 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 598 (1945-46).
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The Convention on International Civil Aviation was designed to
replace the Paris Convention of 19192 and the Habana Convention of
19288 and to create the "first real world organization for civil aviation. ' '4
Unlike many multipartite treaties covering the so-called "specialized"
fields of international relations, it includes in one instrument general
legal commitments as well as the constitution of a permanent organiza-
tion. Its 96 articles are divided into four parts: Parts I and III relating
to air navigation and transport principles respectively; Part II set-
ting forth the Constitution of ICAO; and Part IV relating to such
heterogeneous topics as disposition of disputes over interpretation,
registration of aeronautical agreements, the annexes, and amendment
procedure." The Constitution provides for two basic organs within the
agency - an Assembly representing all the contracting States and a 21
nation Council elected by the former. The criteria determining the
Council's composition suggest the principle adopted in many post-war
inter-state agencies, that states possessing the major interest and power
in the specialized field for which the agency is designed, shall be ac-
corded greater influence in policy-making.6 Consequently, Council
members are to be selected on the basis of their contribution to the
provision of facilities for air navigation, their importance in air trans-
port, and their geographical position so that major world areas may be
represented.7 The character of the Council assumes special interest,
for it is upon this body that the principal functions of the agency
devolve.
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONVENTION PROPER
The organization assumes some quasi-judicial authority in its role
of interpreting the Convention, its Annexes, and infractions thereof,
and it also may undertake broad administrative tasks such as the opera-
tion of navigation facilities on the request or consent of a state.8  It
possesses few powers of a legislative character within the accepted
2 Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Oct. 13, 1919,
11 League of Nations Treaty Ser. 174 (1922) ; also Dep't. State No. 2143 (1944).
The Convention came into force in 1922 and was adhered to by 37 States and the
Saar Territory; four States subsequently denounced it.
3 Commercial Aviation Convention Between the United States of America and
Other American Republics, Feb. 20, 1928, U. S. Treaty Ser. 840 (1929). The
Convention was ratified by the United States in 1931; eleven States in the western
hemisphere were parties to the treaty.
4 J. C. COOPER, THE RIGHT TO FLY 157 (1947). The Paris Convention was
ratified by western Europeon states primarily; the United States, Russia, China
and the majority of South and Central American States did not subscribe to the
treaty.
5 Convention on International Civil Aviation: INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION
CONFERENCE, Chicago, Illinois, Nov. 1 to Dec. 7, 1944, Final Act and Related
Documents, Appendix II, Dept. of State No. 2282, Conference Ser. 64 (1945).
6 The use of this principle in specialized agencies appeared initially in the
1920 Constitution of the International Labor Organization, drafted at the Paris
Peace Conference. THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES AND AFTER, Dept. of State No.
2724, Conference Ser. 92 (1947), Pt. XIII, Art. 7 (393) at 701.
7 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Art. 50 (b), supra note 5.
8 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Art. 71, supra note 5.
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meaning of the term - the power to enact rules obligatory on all mem-
ber states whether or not they agree, thus overruling the will of a dis-
sentient minority. The rights and obligations of a state established
in the Convention may not be altered without its consent. Changes in
or amendments to any of the 96 articles require preliminary approval
by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly, and "come into force" when rati-
fied by two-thirds of the contracting parties or a greater number if the
Assembly so designates. Such amendments, however, change the rights
and obligations of the ratifying states only.9 Time may thus work to
subject states to diverse obligations and rights; the only escape from
the destruction of the uniform character of the Convention lies in the
power conferred upon the Assembly to provide, in its resolution ap-
proving the amendment, that non-ratifying states will cease to be par-
ties to the Convention. This course of action by the Assembly risks
possible reduction in the number of participating states, although it
accords to the plenary body quasi-legislature power.
ADOPTION AND AMENDMENT OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
The 1919 International Convention regulating Aerial Navigation
and the Commission it created have been cited frequently as breaking
new ground in international law-making techniques, primarily because
of the authority accorded to the Commission to amend the Annexes to
the Convention which established air navigation rules.10 Although
the Annexes related to technical matters exclusively, the innovation
has been singled out as exemplifying the conferral of legislative power
of a limited character on an international body. The Chicago Con-
vention does not perpetuate this innovation although its provisions for
enacting international aviation rules are patterned after the 1919 model.
The Council is vested with substantial responsibility for adopting and
amending "international standards and recommended practices and
procedures" pertaining to such subjects as rules of the air, communi-
cations systems and customs and immigration procedures, embracing in
all a list of eleven topics specifically referred to in the Convention; and
"such other matters concerned with the safety, regularity, and efficiency
of air navigation as may from time to time appear appropriate."' The
breadth of subject matter suggested by this concluding phrase negates
the conclusion that the Council's mandate' is constitutionally limited
9 Convention on International Civil Aviation, Art. 94, supra note 5.
10 Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Art. 34 (c),
supra note 2.
11 Convention, Art. 37, supra note 5. The eleven subjects specifically listed
which may be the subject of international standards and recommended practices
are: communications systems and air navigation aids, including ground marking;
characteristics of airports and landing areas; rules of the air and air traffic
control practices; licensing of operating and mechanical personnel; airworthiness
of aircraft; registration and identification of aircraft; collection and exchange of
meteorological information; log books; aeronautical maps and charts; customs and
immigration procedures; aircraft in distress and investigation of accidents.
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to the usual conception of "technical matters."'12 Much effort at the
Chicago Conference was channeled toward the preparation of twelve
such air codes designated also in the Convention, for convenience, as
"Annexes."' 13 Intended originally to be attached to the Convention
when drafted at Chicago, in line with the precedent of the Paris Con-
vention, the twelve Annexes emerged in draft form for submission to
the States for further study and eventual adoption by the Organiza-
tion. 14 Nine Annexes have been adopted by the Council as of March
1949.15 The objective of these codes which are to "become part of fixed
international law" is to insure that "aircraft, flying in all parts of the
world, will comply with the same standards, follow the same procedures,
give and recognize the same signals, everywhere."'16
The drafting and arrangement of the provisions of the Convention
relating to the establishment and amendment of international stand-
ards and recommended procedures as Convention Annexes tend to
,obscure the three basic steps involved in the enactment of these codes
into international air law. The initial step in the intricate procedure
for enactment of such Annexes is undertaken by'the Council of the
Organization as one of its fourteen mandatoy functions and consists
of the adoption of a standard or recommended practice by a two-thirds
vote of the Council at a meeting called for that specific purpose.17 In
contradistinction to the procedure established by the Paris Conven-
tion, the standards and recommendations or amendments thereto do
not assume the character of law by the Council's action alone, but are
subject to what may be designated as a referendum among contracting
States. This referendum, the second step in the adoption of an Annex,provides for its submission to the States for a period of three months
12 The question of the scope of the phrase, "such other matters concerned
with the safety, regularity, and efficiency of air navigation," was raised in meet-
ings of the Economic Commission of the Second Assembly. Objection was offered
to the suggestion that standards and recommended practices might also relate to
insurance requirements on air transport risks on the grounds that Article 37
should not be used to trespass into the realm of "political" matters. The Com-
mission deleted the recommendation for a standard from its report but did not
commit itself on the legality of resorting to the procedure of Article 37 to achieve
uniformity in economic and political matters as well as those more clearly related
to technical subjects. Economic Commission, Minutes of the 12th Meeting, June
16, 1948, ICAO Doc. No. 5672, A2-EC/56, 18/6/48.
13 Convention, Art. 54 (1) and 90, supra note 5.
14 Resolution II, Draft Technical Annexes, supra note 5.
15 ICAO Monthly Bulletin, May 1949. The nine Annexes adopted cover the
following topics: rules of the air; licensing of pilots and air crews on international
routes; meteorological codes; aeronautical maps and charts; dimensional prac-
tices in air ground communications; operation of aircraft, scheduled international
air services; aircraft nationality and registration marks; airworthiness of air-
craft; and facilitation of international air transport.
16 S. W. Morgan, International Civil Aviation Conference at Chicago, What It
Means to the Americas, BLUEPRINT FOR WORLD CIVIL AVIATION, Dept. of State No.
2348, Conference Sec. 70, at 12 (1945).
17 The voting provisions set forth in Article 90 relate to the "adoption" of
Annexes, but it would seem that they also govern subsequent amendment pro-
cedures. Presumably Annexes will be most frequently prepared by the divisions
of the Air Navigation Commission as suggested by C. X and Art. 54 (in) of the
Convention. The Annex on Facilitation of Air Transport was prepared by the
Air Transport Committee.
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or longer, during which States may notify the Council of their dis-
approval. If a majority of States do not object to the measure within
this period, it enters into force and becomes a supplement or Annex to
the Convention. The third and final step involves the application of
the standard by contracting States within the period established by the
Council; however, any state finding it impracticable to comply in all
xespects with an international standard or procedure may exempt itself
from obligation to comply by notifying the Organization immediately
of the variance in its own regulations.'
While it is apparent that the standards adopted by this process, or
subsequent amendments thereto, "are not to be given compulsive
force," this has not been deemed a serious impediment to their general
application. It has been predicted that "states will wish in their own
interest" to adhere to these international aviation codes. 19 By the terms
of the Convention, each state undertakes to collaborate "in securing the
highest practicable degree of uniformity." Moreover, certain privi-
leges mutually accorded to States by the Convention may be denied
parties failing to comply with international standards. Licenses and
certificates of competency and airworthiness issued by States, which do
not meet a minimum standard established by the Organization, need
not be recognized as valid by other contracting States. Aircraft or per-
sonnel failing to satisfy international standards may not participate
in international navigation without the permission of foreign States
into which they enter.20 These provisions provide a form of sanction
against non-conforming states and offer additional incentives for uni-
form application.
The legislative procedure employed in the. development and amend-
ment of air standards and practices has been criticized as a "retrograde
step" in constitution-making and relatively restrictive when contrasted
with the provisions of the Paris Convention which conferred upon the
plenary body of the Organization full and final authority to alter the
technical Annexes to the Convention, effective on notification to con-
tracting States.21 The heterogenous state of development of aviation
throughout the world, in addition to the economic difficulties flowing
from the war, have been advanced as necessitating provision for non-
compliance. 22 Moreover, objections by States to the acceptance of treaty
18 Article 38 also provides that "in the case of amendments to international
standards, any State which does not make the appropriate amendments to its
own regulations or practices shall give notice to the Council within sixty days of
the adoption of the amendment. .. "
19 E. Warner, The Chicago Air Conference, Accomplishments and Unfinished
Business, BLUEPRINT FOR WORLD CIVIL AVIATION, supra note 16 at 27.
20 Convention, Art. 33, 39, and 40, supra note 5.
21 C. Parry, Introductory Note to Constitutions of International Organiza-
tions 23 Brit. Y. B. Int. L. 460 (1946) ; C. W. Jenks, Some Constitutional Problems
of International Organizations, 22 Id. at 68 (1945).
22 The International Civil Aviation Organization, 18 Dep't. State Bull. 465
(1948).
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obligations which they have not approved may have necessitated placing
the standards on a voluntary basis.
DEVELOPMENT OF AMENDMENT PROCEDURES BY THE CHICAGO
CONFERENCE
An examination of the documents of the Chicago Conference re-
veals that the Convention amendment procedure was subjected to ex-
tended study while the provisions relating to the adoption and amend-
ment of international standards and procedures were less carefully
scrutinized. Committee I of the Conference devoted itself to the draft-
ing of the Convention and was in turn divided into three subcommittees
correspondingly roughly to three of the four parts of the Convention
as finally enacted.28 The American and Canadian Convention pro-
posals were adopted as a basis of discussion in the subcommittees of
Committee 1.24 The provisions regarding the establishment of stand-
ards in the American proposal substantially resemble the first two steps
required under the Chicago Convention. Standards and amendments
thereto were to be "drawn up by the Executive Council, approved by
two-thirds of the votes present, and submitted to each member State of
the Assembly"; they were to become effective "within a prescribed time
after their submittal to each State member of the Assembly, unless a
majority of the State members of the Assembly have registered their
disapproval" within a time prescribed by the Council. Moreover, the
contracting States were to agree to act in accordance with any regula-
tions established by the Organization. 25 The discretion accorded States
in accepting or rejecting international regulations under the Chicago
Convention was not anticipated by the original American plan. The
Canadian Convention proposals followed more closely the Paris Con-
vention, and proposed that amendments to the standards should be
binding on the member States as soon as adopted by the Assembly by
at least two-thirds of the total possible votes. 26
The American plan for amending the basic law of the Convention
imposed a duty on the Executive Council to initiate and receive sug-
gested modifications. Amendments approved by a three-fourths vote
of those present in the Council were to be passed to the Assembly for
majority approval of that body. All amendments so approved were to
become effective only if they received unanimous ratification by the
23 INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION CONFERENCE, Resolution 2 of Committee 1,
:Doe. No. 44, 1/3, I PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION CONFER-
ENCE 549 (1948); adopted at the first meeting of Committee I, Nov. 3, 1944
Verbatim Minutes of Organization Meeting of Committee I, Doc. No. 46, 1/4, id
at 532.
24 Minutes of the Second Meeting of Subcommittee 1 of Committee 1, Nov. 7,
1944, Doc. No. 102, 1/1/2, Id. at 647.
25 Proposal by the Delegation of the United States of America of a Convention
on Air Navigation, Doc. No. 16, 1/7, Art. 24 (5) (6) and Art. 25, Id. at 554.26
.Revised Preliminary Draft of an International Air Convention (prepared
for the Canadian Government), Doc. No. 50, 1/7, Art. 50 (2), Id. at 570.
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States.2 In contrast, the Canadian plan suggested a simpler and less
restrictive approach to change. Amendments to the Convention arti-
cles were to be examined and adopted by the Assembly by majority
vote. They were to become effective on ratification by a number of
states to be subsequently designated, presumably by less than unani-
mous membership ratification.28
The divergent views of the United States, Canada, and Great Brit-
ain regarding the economic control of aviation led to a closed confer-
ence of the three powers from November twelfth to twentieth. The
draft proposal which emerged from. the joint effort, a partial draft of
"sections of an International Air Convention relating primarily to
Air Transport," adopted the American plan for amendment of inter-
national standards.29 No provision for alteration of the Convention
proper was included in this joint draft. A joint subcommittee formed
to consider the three-nation proposal suggested to its drafting commit-
tee that it insert a provision for amendment of the Convention iself by
a two-thirds vote of the Assembly, subject to ratification by all contract-
ing States.80 The drafting committee liberalized the suggested pro-
cedure for amendment of the Convention so that unanimity in ratifi-
cation would not be required for the effectiveness of an amendment,
although only ratifying States would be bound.8' A Committee of
Legal Advisers, asked to consider this article in the light of constitu-
tional difficulties, proposed two alternative drafts. The first draft
followed the pattern established by the drafting committee. The sec-
ond draft was divided into two sections8 2:
(1) Amendments to the Convention may be proposed by the Assembly by
a two-thirds vote of those present. A proposal for an amendment
adopted by the Assembly shall be submitted to each Contracting State
for ratification in accordance with the constitutional practice of the
State. An amendment shall take effect one year after it has been
ratified by two-thirds of the Contracting States. This two-thirds
majority shall include two-thirds of the Member States of the
Council.
(2) At any time during the six months following the ratification of an
amendment by the necessary majority, any Contracting State which
has not ratified the amendment may inform the Council that it dis-
sents therefrom; in that case it shall not be bound by the amendment
but shall cease to be a member of the Organization as soon as the
amendment takes effect, notwithstanding anything to the contrary
elsewhere in this Convention.
27 Art. 24 (2), supra note 25.
28 Art. 50 (1) and 3 (1), supra note 26.
29 Section of an International Air Convention Relating Primarily to Air
Transport, Art. 19 (3), Doc. No. 358, 1/13, IV/6, Nov. 20, 1944, I PROCEEDINGS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION CONFERENCE 418 (1948).
30 Minutes of Second Meeting of Joint Subcommittee of Committees I, III,
IV, Doe. No. 398, 1/23, 111/38, IV/16, Nov. 25, 1944, Id. at 469.
31 Revised Draft of Document 358, Art. 19 (3), Doe. 402, (358) 1/25, 111/39,
IV/19, Nov. 26, 1944, Id. at 404.
32 Third Revised Draft of Document 358, (Articles to be Distributed among
Parts II, III, and IV, and renumbered accordingly), Art. 19 (3), Doc. No. 442,
1/44, 111/56, IV/38, Nov. 29, 1944, Id. at 375.
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Discussion of these two alternatives in the joint subcommittee
indicated that the majority of the conferees considered the second
alternative objectionable on two grounds: namely, that it would force
a non-ratifying state to withdraw from the Organization and that some
States would encounter constitutional limitations in agreeing to be
bound by amendments which they did not ratify. The United States
delegation indicated that it would have to enter a reservation, if the
second draft were adopted,3 3 although it has approved similar pro-
visions in other international conventions.
The second draft proposal of the Committee of Legal Advisers fol-
lowed the amendment provision of the Covenant of the League of
Nations; it also suggested a pattern subscribed to in other inter-state
agencies of this post-war period in that it accorded to members of the
Council, an organ representative of the principal powers in aviation,
a special voting prerogative. At the same time it provided for legisla-
tion by a qualified majority which was empowered, in effect, to bind
the minority by its decisions although the latter might escape by with-
drawing from the organization. It thus sought to maintain among the
members consistent convention obligations at all times. The principle
that dissent automatically terminates membership was ultimately modi-
fied and incorporated into the first of the two drafts prepared by the
Legal Advisers. After further rephrasing, it accorded to the Assembly
discretionary power to determine whether an amendment was suffi-
ciently important to justify automatic termination of the Convention
engagement if not ratified.
The provisions regarding international standards which appeared
in the three-power draft remained unchanged. The draft of the sub-
committee preparing Part I of the Convention embracing air naviga-
tion principles, which was ultimately combined with the revised
three-power draft, included the article which destroyed the obligatory
force of the standards envisaged in the United States and three-power
proposals.8 '
EARLY ATTEMPTS AT LAW-MAKING IN INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES
The Chicago Conference, meeting in the last winter of World War
II, a half year before the United Nations Organization assumed concrete
form, could draw principally on the experiences of the pre-war inter-
national bodies in approaching the task of constitution-making. 5 A
83 Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the Joint Subcommittee of Committees
1, II, IV, December 1, 1944, Doe. No. 460, 1/53, 111/66, IV/48, Id. at 488.
34 Second Supplement to Second Interim Report of Drafting Committee of
Subcommittee 2, Committee I, Chapter VI, Art. 32 and 33, Doc. No. 437, 1/2/33,
Nov. 30, 1944, Id. at 668.
35 The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, a tempor-
ary agency created in November 1943, and the United Nations Food and Agricul-
tural Organization, whose constitution was published in July 1943, were the only
two specialized agencies of the post-war or war period which preceded the Chicago
Conference in order of organization.
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perusal of pre-war international organizations would seem to reveal
that, .although the rule of unanimity in voting procedures in such or-
gans has seldom been consistently adhered to, few organizations have
been endowed with essential law-making powers.86 Some organizations,
however, have been accorded or have gradually assumed through prac-
tice a large degree of legislative power in affecting changes in the basic
convention of the organization and in other instances by adoption of
rules supplementary to the fundamental treaty obligations.
The Universal Postal Union stands forth as the classic illustration
of international bodies in which the unanimity rule has been aban-
doned in the interest of more 'effective international organization.3 7
In 1874 a conference of 22 states, including the United States, produced
the first Postal Convention establishing the "General" Postal Union.
The inevitability of rapid change in this technical field was recognized
even in this first conference and accordingly the delegates incorporated
into the Convention provision for periodic Congresses of the Union to
be "held with a view of perfecting the system of the Union, of intro-
ducing into it improvements found necessary. ... 38 The Convention
provided for one vote for each country in these Congresses but omitted
any reference to voting requirements for effecting the contemplated
changes.8 9 Congresses meeting in subsequent years adopted their own
rules of procedure by a majority vote, providing for decisions of 'the
Congress, including changes in the basic agreement itself, by a majority
vote also.40 Ratification of the Convention was called for but the possi-
ble limitations of legislating ad referendum were mitigated by provid-
ing that the Convention would come into effect on July 1, 1875,
repealing all previous commitments. 41 Subsequent revisions of this
provision over the years have resulted in offering members the choice
of accepting changes in the Convention on a fixed date or withdrawing
from the Union, for earlier conventions-are annulled by the entry into
force of the new engagement. The benefits of freedom of transit for a
state's mail have made withdrawal extremely unattractive and the prac-
tice has therefore emerged of treating Conventions as effective on the
36 C. A. RICHES, MAJORITY RULE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 293 (1940).
37 Treaty Concerning the Formation of a General Postal Union, 1874, 19 U.S.
Statutes at Large 577 (1877), The last Congress met in 1947, see 17 Dep't. State
Bull. 585 (1947).
38 Art. 18, Ibid.
39 Beginning at the Paris Congress of 1878, the principle of one vote per
country has been substantially modified in effect by granting to colonial posses-
sions separate votes despite almost continuous opposition from non-colonial pow-
ers. See L. B. Sohn, Multiple Representation in International Assemblies, 40 Am.J. Int. L. 79-84 (1946); also, L. S. WOOLF, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT, 198-99(1916). A draft convention, prepared by Germany, in 1874, which furnished the
basis of discussion, provided that "no modification may be proposed to the present
convention affecting the rates and the question of transit, unless by the unanimous
consent of the Union representatives at the Congress." This more rigid procedure
was rejected. J. F. Sly, The Genesis of the Universal Postal Union, International
Conciliation 407 (1937).
40 L. S. WOOLF, op. cit. supra note 39 at 192, 194.
41 Treaty of 1874, Art. 19, 20, supra note 37. Article 19 also provided for
withdrawal on one year's notice after the expiration of three years.
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prescribed date, without waiting for ratifications which may be delayed
for several years.42 Congresses have evolved into a permanent legisla-
tive organ by the combination of three factors: treaties which were
unique in providing for their application on a definite date, abrogating
all previous engagements; a practice of achieving decisions by a majority
vote; and most important, a tacit acceptance by a dissenting minority
that the association's practical value outweighed the possible disadvan-
tages which might flow from acceptance of the majority's wishes.
It has been emphasized that the legislative techniques adopted by
the Union may have resulted principally from the nature of its work
and the character of its delegates. The Union would obviously be
deemed a "non-political" organization under a League of Nations
classification which has been interpreted by one writer to designate
the regulations of international activity pertaining chiefly to the inter-
ests of individuals in contrast to the relations between states as "political
units. ' 43 In addition, the drafters of the 1874 Convention and the
delegates to the subsequent periodic Congresses have been primarily
men technically trained in the field whose primary, concern is efficient
functioning of the Union.4 4
The Postal Union of the Americas and Spain, born in 1921, followed
the legislative pattern of the world-wide Union.4 , Modifications of
the basic law of the Union may be effected by the Congresses by major-
ity vote. Conventions come into effect on a designated date, supersed-
ing previous treaties. The alternative to acceptance of the majority's
decision is withdrawal. 46
INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION IN THE LEAGUE ERA
The birth of the League of Nations in 1920 ushered in a period in
which international organization expanded and undertook compara-
tively substantial functions. Although the Assembly of the League was
obviously not an international parliament, it assumed some legislative
power in amending the Covenant, its basic legislation. The Covenant
42 WOOLF, op. cit. 8upra note 39 at 195; M. Gabrini, Summary of the Work
of the Universal Postal Union from 1874, International Conciliation 137 (1937).
43 F. S. DUNN, THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF INTERNATIONAL CONFER-
ENCES 36 (1929). The League Report of the Committee of Experts for the Pro-
gressive Codification of International Law is reprinted in 20 Am. J. Int. L. Supp.
204 (1926).
44 Sly, supra note 39 at 403.
45Pan-American Postal Union-Principal Convention ... Sept. 15, 1921, 30
League of Nations Treaty Ser. 157 (1924-25). The Union was subsequently
designated as the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain. The Fifth Congress
met in September 1946. 14 Dep't. State Bull. 815 (1946).
46 Article 19 of the 1921 Convention provided that it should come into force
on Jan. 1, 1923 abrogating the South American Postal Convention of 1911 and
that withdrawals could be effected on one year's notice. Article 15 establishes the
procedure by which modifications of the Convention may be carried out in the
five year intervals between majority or simple majority in other cases. None of
the nineteen articles refers to the vote required in Congresses for modification of
the Convention and the majority vote principle of the Universal Postal Union
has apparently been duplicated. See RICHES, op. cit. supra note 36.
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provided for amendments to take effect when ratified by the States
represented in the Council and a majority of the Assembly members;
it was silent as to the vote required for proposing amendments. 47 A
strict interpretation of the unanimity rule required in Assembly voting
could have been anticipated for the approval of amendments in an
organization predominantly political in character. However, the As-
sembly drew a technical distinction between "decisions" which under
the Covenant would demand a unanimous vote and "recommendations"
having no binding effect on members per se and therefore valid if
approved by only a majority.48 Assimilating this distinction to the
adoption of amendments, since the latter imposed no obligations until
ratified, the Assembly proposed changes in the Covenant by the same
vote required for ratification - a majority of the Assembly including
the concurring consent of States represented in the Council.49 The
Covenant presented a further innovation, for a State signifying its
dissent from an amendment was not bound thereby but automatically
ceased to be a member of the League. Although numerous examples
appear in earlier political conferences of states of the imposition of
obligations on unwilling parties,50 the incorporation of this principle
into treaty established it as a valid legal procedure, indicating a signifi-
cant break with the past in legislative technique.
The International Labor Organization, also a product of the Paris
Peace Conference, substantially followed the Covenant amendment
provisions. However, no provision for withdrawal or automatic ter-
mination of membership for non-ratifying states appeared in its 1919
Constitution.51 Although the procedural aspects of the amendment
47 Art. 26 of the Covenant, THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES AND AFTER, Pt. I,
eupra note 6 at 105.
48 LEAGUE OF NATIONS, RECORDS OF THE FIRST ASSEMBLY, Plenary Meetings,
414-435, (1920).
49 LEAGUE OF NATIONS, RECORDS OF THE SECOND ASSEMBLY, Plenary Meetings,
676-681, 723-733 (1921) The Report of Committee I, "Conditions of Voting on,
and Ratification of Amendments to the Covenant," appears as Annex B to the
minutes of the twenty-eighth Plenary Meeting of the Assembly. Id. at 708. At
the twenty-ninth Meeting the Assembly also adopted the resolution that no amend-
ment would be passed during that session unless it received a three-fourths ma-
jority vote of the Members including the votes of all the Members of the Coun-
cil represented at the meeting. However, the Assembly accepted and passed the
resolution of the First Committee that amendments could be proposed by a
majority vote of the Assembly including the unanimous votes of all Council Mem-
bers, apparently establishing a precedent in view of the failure of the proposed
amendment to Article 26 to come into effect.
50 The practice of revising treaties effecting European political settlements
without the consent of all the signatories, appears to have been common in the
nineteenth century and many parts of the 1919 Peace Treaties were subject to
revision without the consent of all parties. See H. J. TOBIN, THE TERMINATION
OF MULTIPARTITE TREATIES 206-249 (1933).
51 Constitution of th~e International Labor Organization, Art. 36 (422), Pt.
XIII of the Treaty of Versailles, supra note 6 at 716. Amendments of the Con-
stitution, adopted by two-thirds of the votes cast at the Organization's Conference,
took effect when ratified by three-fourths of the Members including the States
composing the Council of the League. The Conference was composed of four
representatives of each State, two government delegates and two representing
employer and employee groups within the State respectively. The British draft
convention, taken as a basis of discussion at the second meeting of the Commis-
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provisions of the Covenant and the Labor Organization's Constitution
marked progress toward more flexible procedure, the necessity for
unanimous Council approval presented a formidable obstacle to change
and growth.52
Although less widely publicized than the League or the ILO, other
organizations of this period were accorded a legislative role equally
unique. The International Relief Union of 1932, through its plenary
body, could amend by a two-thirds vote the Statute attached to the
Convention, containing provisions governing the internal organization
of the Union and its financial control.53 Ratification being eliminated
completely, the procedure of the Organization assimilated closely that
existing in national parliaments. The Railway Union offers a possible
precedent for the provisions relating to adoption and amendment of
standards in the Chicago Convention. The Committee of Experts of
the Union, in which each State was entitled to representation, could
effect changes in Annex I of the Convention which were effective in
three months unless two governments objected in the interval. 54
Increasing recognition of the need of flexibility and change in
international arrangements may be found in some of the treaties of
this period also. The Montreux Convention of 1936, establishing the
Turkish Straits regime, provides for revision of two articles of the Con-
vention by three-fourths majority vote. 55 The International Sanitary
sion on International Labor Legislation appointed by the Peace Conference, pro-
vided that amendments could be submitted to the Conference of the Organization
but should "only come into effect if they are unanimously agreed to and ratified
by all the High Contracting Parties" which by virtue of Article 1 were the Mem-
bers of the League. International Labor Office, I OFFICIAL BULLETIN 15 (1923).
At the fourteenth meeting of the Commission, a British delegate suggested that
the wording be revised to follow the pattern established by Article 26 of the
Covenant and a Belgian delegate advocated modifications of the Convention by a
two-thirds majority of the votes cast. These suggestions produced the query from
Mr. deBustamente of Cuba as to whether it was possible "to admit that an obliga-
tion could be imposed on a Sovereign State by a decision in which it had not in
fact concurred?" Id. at 72. The article as finally drafted was approved at the
fifteenth meeting of the Commission although reservations regarding the amend-
ment procedure were entered by Bolivia, Equador, Cuba and Panama when the
Commission's draft was approved by the Preliminary Peace Conference in April
1919. Id. at 30!.
52 Jenks, upra note 21 at 65. Seventeen protocols of amendment to the Cov-
enant were drawn up and five entered into force. The I.L.O. Constitution was
amended on one occasion in the inter-war period; an amendment to Article 7 (393)
was adopted by the Conference in November 1922, but failed to enter into force
until June 1934.53 Convention and Statute Establishing An International Relief Union at
Geneva, July 12, 1927; Art. 21. 135 League of Nations Treaty Ser. 247 (1932-33).
The Convention failed to enter into force until 1932. Article 6 provided that the
General Council would consist of one delegate for each Member State; Article 19
permitted withdrawal.
54 International Convention Concerning the Traffic of Goods by Rail, Signed at
Berne, Oct. 23, 1924; Art. 60 (2). 77 League of Nations Treaty Ser. 367 (1926-
27). The Convention entered into force in 1927. Annex 1 related to detailed
technical regulations for "Articles Accepted for Carriage." All states could be
represented on the Committee, and decisions of the Committee were made by a
majority vote. Annex VII, Regulations Regarding the Committee, Art. 1 and 5.
55 Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits. The Convention is re-
printed in 31 Am. J. Int. L. Supp. 1 (1936). Article 29 provided that Revisions of
Articles 14 and 18 could be effected by a three-fourths majority of the High Con-
tracting Parties, including the Black Sea Powers.
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Convention for Aerial Navigation of 1933 devised a novel technique
for revision which has been cited as a precedent for provisions of the
World Health Organization's Constitution. Modifications approved
by the International Office of Public Hygiene were to enter into force
within twelve monthis of their circulation among the contracting States,
if two-thirds of the parties approved; such approval was manifested by
express consent or from failure to register objections within the pre-
scribed period, although dissenting parties were not bound by the
majority's decision; 56 states were called upon to "contract out" of obli-
gations, being bound unless they expressly dissented.
AMENDMENTS TO THE ANNEXES OF THE PARIS CONVENTION
The 43 provisions of the 1919 Convention Relating to the Regula-
tion of Aerial Navigation obviously played a role in shaping the 96
articles of the Chicago Convention. The International Commission
for Air Navigation was the only permanent body established by the
Paris Convention and it included representatives of all states although
until 1926 a system of weighted voting was utilized to protect the inter-
ests of the large powers and not until 1933 did complete equality in
voting rights prevail.57 The Commission was entrusted with the power
of amending the "provisions of the Annexes A-G" which consisted of
seven codes relating to air navigation principles similar to the Chicago
standards and recommended practices. 58 The Annexes were attached
to the Convention as an integral part. Annex amendments were origi-
nally effected by a vote of three-fourths of the total vote possible if all
representatives were present. By a Convention amendment effective
in 1933, this procdure was modified so that a three-fourths vote of the
Commission, including at least two-thirds of the total possible votes if
all States participated, would permit revision. Modifications entered
into law, without subsequent ratification of the contracting States, on
notification by the Commission.
Amendments to the Convention itself were achieved by a two-thirds
vote of the total possible vote but became effective only if ratified by
56 International Sanitary Convention for Aerial Navigation, April 12, 1933;
Art. 61; 161 League of Nations Treaty Ser. 65 (1935-36). The Convention was
revised by UNRRA in 1944, effective 1945. 14 Dep't. State Bull. 451. A protocol
to prolong the Convention became effective on April 30, 1946. Id. at 331. The
United States entered a reservation to Article 61 of the original Convention to the
effect that no amendments will be binding on this Government unless accepted
by it.
57 By protocol of amendment adopted by the Commission at its fourth session,
June 30, 1923, which entered into force in Dec. 1926, each state represented in
the Commission was henceforth entitled to one vote but modifications of the An-
nexes still required a vote of three-fourths of the total vote of the Commission
including three of the five following States: The United States (not a party to the
Convention), the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan. 78 League of Nations
Treaty Ser. 441 (1928). The Commission held an extraordinary session in June
1929 to which it invited non-contracting States with a view to facilitating their
adhesion by a general revision of the Convention. Sixteen non-contracting parties
participated. The Final Resolutions included modification of Article 34 to de-
prive the five enumerated States of their special voting rights. International Com-
mission for Air Navigation, OFFICIAL BULLETIN No. 16, 33-34. This revision
entered into force in 1933. 138 League of Nations Treaty Ser. 418 (1933).5 8 Supra note 2.
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all members. 59 In contrast to the Annex revision procedure, this ar-
rangement seems unduly restrictive.
The 1919 Aerial Convention was drafted by the Aviation Commis-
sion of the Paris Peace Conference, a group of military experts chiefly,
representing twelve states with double representation accorded the five
larger powers. 60 A British draft convention apparently first suggested
the provision for alteration of the Annexes and the technical portions
of the Convention without subsequent state ratification; it provided,
however, that such alterations should be achieved only by unanimous
vote of the Commission.61 The Commission was to be composed of two
representatives from each of the five principal powers and five other
representatives elected by the contracting States. Objections by the
minor powers to their exclusion from the Commission led to the com-
plicated weighted voting procedure according more control to the
major powers, with membership on the Commission open to all states.
Although the Annex modification procedure seems comparatively
progressive, it has been pointed out that until 1933 an extremely small
minority could block change.62 Moreover, the Commission was limited
somewhat in its ability to keep abreast of change in aerial navigation,
for its power regarding the Annexes was of a revisionary nature only.
Unlike the Chicago Convention which permits the Council to draft and
adopt standards covering a wide variety of topics, the Paris Convention
strictly circumscribed the substantive field in which the Commission
could act.63
RECENT INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS
Turning to the current international scene, a brief glance at other
international bodies existing today would seem to indicate that the
Chicago Convention, as previously suggested, may be characterized
as representing a rather orthodox approach to world cooperation. The
imposition of obligations on states without their consent is still a rare
phenomenon although amendment procedures have tended to abolish
the unanimity requirement. The Charter of the United Nations, the
only non-regional political organ of this era, provides for an amend-
ment procedure similar but less rigid than the League's. Amendments
59 Art. 34 supra note 2.
60 J. C. COOPER, op. cit. supra note 4 at 27. The five powers to be accorded
double representation on the 1919 Commission were the United States, Britain,
Japan,, Italy, and France.
61 RICHES, op. cit. supra note 36 at 82.
62 RICHES, op. cit. supra note 36 at 94.
63 The Commission interpreted "modifications" of the Annexes (Convention
Article 34) to permit addition of new matters to complete the regulations "within
the general framework of the convention." International Commission for Air
Navigation, XV OFFICIAL BULLETIN 37 (May 1929), Resolution No. 436. The
1919 Commission met for its twenty-eighth session in Aug. 1945 to bring its tech-
nical annexes into conformity with the draft annexes prepared at Chicago, for
the period during which it would remain in existence. 13 Dep't. State Bull. 294
(1945).
CONSENT IN AMENDING CHICAGO CONVENTION
adopted by two-thirds of the Assembly's members come into force upon
ratification by two-thirds of the Members including all the permanent
Members of the Security Council. 64 No withdrawal clause appears in
the Charter, although considerable debate centered around its omis-
sion, primarily as a result of the voting prerogatives accorded the prin-
cipal powers in amending the Convention. A committee report ad-
vocating the omission of such a clause concluded that a dissenting state
might legally withdraw rather than accept the alteration of its rights
and obligations. 65
Although designed as a temporary body, the United Nations Relief
and Rehabilitation Administration provided the initial effort at global
cooperation by the war allies and revealed to some degree the pattern
for specialized agencies in the new era of international organizations
it opened.66 Born of an inter-governmental agreement signed by 44
states in November 1943, UNRRA was assigned the task of planning,
coordinating and administering measures "for the relief of victims of
war in any area under the control of any of the United Nations ... "
The resolutions of the Council, its plenary body, passed by majority
vote, could be considered legislative in character only in so far as the
internal functioning of the Administration was concerned, for they
imposed no obligations on Members without their consent. 67  The
amendment procedure of the Convention divided proposals into three
groups: amendments creating new obligations for member States re-
quired Council approval and bound only those States accepting them.
Other amendments became obligatory merely by Council adoption;
while modification of two of the Convention articles took effect on
Council approval, including also the unanimous vote of the Central
Committee. 8 This distinction as to the substantive character of amend-
ments appears frequently in recent constitutions.
The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization, the first
permanent post-war specialized body, has been aptly described as a
64 CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE RE-
SULTS OF THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE, Dep't. State No. 2349, Conference
Ser. 71 (1945). Article 108 appears in Appendix A at 228. Article 109 provides
for a General Conference of Members to revise the Charter on the vote of two-
thirds of the Assembly Members and any seven Members of the Security Coun-
cil; alterations recommended by a two-thirds vote of the Conference are brought
into force in the same manner as amendments approved by the Assembly.
65 Draft Report of Rapporteur to Committee 1/2 on the Meeting of the Special
Subcommittee, Doc. No. 329, 1/2/33, May 25, 1945, 7 U.N. Conf. Doc. 86
(1945). The report was adopted at the eleventh meeting of Committee 1/2, Doc.
No. 538, 1/2/34, May 24, 1945. Id. at 95.66 The UNRRA Agreement text appears in 9 Dep't. State Bull. 211 (1943).
The agreement has been described as the product of "multiple individual negotia-
tion," departing from the more common conference or interim commission method
of drafting international agreements. P. C. Jessup, The First Session of the
Council of UNRRA, 38 Am. J. Int. L. 102 (1944). Also, H. A. Robertson, Some
Legal Problems of UNRRA, 23 Brit. Y.B. Int. L. 142 (1946).
67 Jessup Id. at 105; also Jessup, UNRRA, Sample of World Organization,
22 Foreign Affairs 362 (1943-44).
6s Article VIII. A two-thirds vote of the Council was required for adoption
of all amendments. UNRRA concluded its activities on June 30, 1947, some of its
functions being assumed by the International Refugee Organization.
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"fact-finding and advisory agency." 69 Amendments involving new obli-
gations for member Nations take effect only on ratification by two-
thirds of the contracting States and then only for parties ratifying. In-
consistent obligations may thus exist among the membership. All
other amendments are effective on a two-thirds majority vote "of all
the members of the Conference."7 The United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization has a more liberal amendment
procedure, perhaps because of the supposedly less vital nature of its
work. The British delegates to the Conference creating UNESCO
proposed that amendments would be effective on apprvoal by the Gen-
eral Conference of the organization and the United Nations General
Assembly. The United States opposed this position maintaining its
right to pass on important alterations in agreements to which it was a
party. 1 A compromise was achieved whereby amendments approved
by the Conference involving fundamental alterations in the aims of
the Organization or new obligations for members require ratification
by two-thirds of the members before coming into force for all parties
to the Convention. Other amendments are effective after Conference
approval.12
The International Monetary Fund and the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, both highly specialized agencies
performing vital functions, have adopted an elaborate weighted voting
system based on financial contribution. Amendments to both Con-
stitutions in most cases may be effected by acceptance of three-fifths of
the Members. Both Constitutions recognize the right to withdraw from
the Organizations.7 3
The International Labor Organization's amended constitution and
the constitution of the World Health Organization provide for change
69 Press Release of Aug. 23, 1944, relating to the Report of the Interim Com-
mission on Food and Agriculture, 11 Dep't. State Bull. 207 (1944). Article I
establishes the functions of the Organization-to collect and disseminate infor-
mation, and to make recommendations and submit conventions regarding agri-
cultural products and marketing; to furnish technical assistance on request.
Article XI imposes the duty on Members to make periodic reports on progress
towards the achievement of the aims of the organization and on the action taken
in regard to recommendations and conventions submitted by the Organization.
Hearings Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H. J. Res. 145, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1945).
70 Article 20 of the Constitution. Article 19 provides for withdrawal after
the expiration of four years from the date of acceptance of the Constitution.
United Nations Constitution of the Food and Agricultural Organization, 40 Am.
J. Int. L. Supp. 76 (1946).
71 "the defenses of peace," Documents Relating to United Nations Educational
Scientific and Cultural Organization, Pt. II, Dep't. of State No. 2457, Conference
Ser. 80, p. 34.
72 Art. 13, Pt. I, Id. at 13. The Conference has power according to the same
article of the Constitution to adopt, by a -two-thirds majority, rules to carry out
the article. Like FAO, UNESCO has three principal organs: a Conference rep-
resenting all states which is the policy-making body, an Executive Board acting
under the authority of the Conference, and an administrative division.
73 UNITED NATIONS MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONFERENCE, 1944, Final Act
and Related Documents, Dep't. of State No. 2187, Conference Ser. 55; Articles
of Agreement of International Monetary Fund, Annex A, Art. 17; Articles of
Agreement of the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, Annex
B, Art. 8. Acceptance by all the Members is required for amendments modifying
three sections in each respective constitution.
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without the consent of all of the membership,74 while the International
Refugee Organization 75 and the International Trade Organization76
cling to the more orthodox rule that amendments involving alterations
in obligations are only effective for ratifying States. Both of the latter
organizations, however, permit the adoption of other amendments by
a less rigid procedure. The International Trade Organization's amend-
ment article closely resembles that of the Chicago Convention, for the
plenary body of the Organization, when approving an amendment,
may determine that it is of such a nature as to warrant "suspension"
of States failing to ratify. Suspension from the rights and privileges
of membership in the organization appears preferable to termination
of convention engagements of dissenting states and perhaps as useful
in persuading acceptance of the majority will.
RULE-MAKING PROCEDURE IN WHO
The World Health Organization is the only post-war agency with
rule-making procedures substantially similar to the Chicago Conven-
tion's provisions on standards. The general policy-making organ of
the agency, the Assembly, is endowed with authority to adopt regula-
tions by majority vote concerning five classes of subjects: sanitary and
quarantine arrangements; nomenclature with respect to disease, causes
of death and public health practices; standards as to diagnostic pro-
cedure; standards on biological and pharmaceutical products in com-
merce; and advertising and labeling. Such regulations adopted by the
Assembly come into force for all members after notice, "except for such
members as may notify" their rejection or reservation within that
period.77 This procedure requires states to assert dissent by affirmative
action, if they desire to escape treaty obligations; labeled as the "con-
tracting out" principle, it is a procedural innovation designed to re-
place the older principle whereby states had to designate assent to be
bound, to contract into obligations, and inaction avoided liability.
74 Constitution of the International Health Organization: REPORT OF THE
UNITED STATES DELEGATION ON THE INTERNATIONAL HEALTH CONFERENCE, 1946,
Dep't. of State No. 2703, Conference Ser. 91, Art. 73 at 43; Constitution of the
International Labor Organization, 29 OFFICIAL BULLETIN 203 (1946), Art. 36.
Under the new amendment procedure of the I.L.O. the proportion of Members
required for ratification has been reduced from three-fourths to two-thirds, al-
though this proportion must include five of the-eight states of chief industrial
importance. The twenty-seventh session of the Conference in November 1945
adopted the Constitution of the I.L.O. Instrument of Amendment 1045, altering,
inter alia, the amendment procedure of Article 36; it came into force in accord-
ance with its terms on Sept. 26, 1946, thirty-nine Members having ratified it.
Withdrawal from the Organization is now legally provided for the first time in
Article 1 (5).
75 Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, Art. 16, U.N.
Doc. No. A/284 (1947), Amendments not involving new obligations for Members
are effective on ratification by. two-thirds of the Members.
70 United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, 1948, Havana
Charter, Art. 100; U.N. Doc. No. E/Conf. 2/78 (1948) at 51. Amendments not
altering the obligatidns of Members become effective on Conference approval by
two-thirds majority of the Members.
77 Art. 21 of the Constitution. See W. R. Sharp, The New World Health
Organization, 41 Am. J. Int. L. 526 (1947).
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Although the World Health Organization was the first international
body created on the instigation of the United Nation's Economic and
Social Council and therefore not. an agency which can be deemed a
product of any one state, the United States was apparently responsible
for the development of the concept of "contracting out," prompted by
the need. of "a mechanism in the international field which would permit,
rapid general application of new scientific techniques in the interna-
tional control of the spread of disease."7 8 The Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is credited with suggesting that some method be found to
accomplish the above result without "requiring that Committee to con-
sider highly specialized technical matters.179 The procedural mechan-
ism incorporated in the constitution of the Organization is designed
to avoid constitutional obstacles in United States' participation since
modification of existing domestic regulations will permit cooperation
in most instances and may be effected by the executive branch of the
government alone. This government is further protected, if substan-
tial changes are involved, by the provision for rejection or reservation.
In the World Health Conference this provision encountered oppo-
sition; it was promptly branded as an infringement of sovereignty
although a special legal committee found no validity in that argument.
It was pointed out that each State participates in the Assembly and there-
fore is a party to the legislative process by which the regulations will
be developed, although a majority is empowered to overrule the wishes
of a minority. The 1933 Sanitary Convention noted above was cited
as precedent for the arrangement; there was divided opinion as to
whether the International Aviation Convention provisions regarding
standards could be so considered.80
The "contracting out" device differs from the procedure relating
to amendment of international standards in the Chicago Convention
for the Health Assembly's vote alone is necessary for the adoption of
rules, although the effective date is temporarily postponed. Subsequent
collective State approval is not required for placing the regulations in
effect for a majority of States. As in the Chicago Convention, however,
each member may exempt itself from compliance by notice given in a
specified time."' The Health Organization's legislative procedure is
78REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION ON THE INTERNATIONAL HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, supra note 74 at 17.
79 Ibid.
so Id. at 18.
81 "Contracting out" of legal obligations in contrast to "contracting in" is a
device more frequently resorted to in this era of international organization.
Article 10 of the Articles of Agreement of the Bank provides that where approval
of any Member is required for the act of the Bank, it will be deemed to be given
unless the Member objects in reasonable time after notice. See P. J. Baker,
The Codification of International Law, 5 Brit. Y.B. Int. L. 63 (1924), where it
was suggested that an improvement in the machinery of the general law-making
convention could be produced by the insertion in the convention of the "provision
that ratification of every signatory power would be assumed, unless within a
certain fixed period" it indicated intent not to ratify. See also Proposal 23,
The International Law of the Future, A. 13. A. (1944).
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shortened by the omission of one step embodied in the Chicago Con-
vention. the second step in the adoption of standards, calling for ap-
proval of Council action by states before the regulation assumes the
character of law. Moreover, the organs in which this rule-making
power resides in each of the agencies differ somewhat in character, for
the Council is the repository of this authority under the Chicago Con-
vention and its membership, as previously indicated, is confined to
twenty-one states selected on an interest basis. In contrast, the plenary
body assumes this legislative function in the Health Organization thus
substantiating the argument that no infringement of sovereignty occurs
since each state participates in the legislative process.
With the exception of the two primary political organizations of
this century, the League and the United Nations, the plenary bodies
of international agencies have usually exercised any powers of a legis-
lative nature entrusted to the institution. The protection or recogni-
tion of states of major importance in aviation, as suggested by the
provisions determining Council membership, in addition to the in-
creased efficiency which may be anticipated in a smaller group oper-
ating in almost continuous session, may be advanced as justification for
endowing the Council rather than the Assembly with rule-making
power. It may be questioned, however, whether these persuasive fac-
tors are not balanced to some degree by the disadvantages and delays
arising from the procedural step calling for state referendum on An-
nexes after Council action. This referendum might be eliminated if
standards were approved by the Assembly, states being sufficiently
protected by the provisions for non-compliance.
REVISIONS OF ARTICLE 94 PROPOSED BY ICAO
While little dissatisfaction has been evidenced by member States
with the Convention provisions on adoption of standirds, the procedure
for amendment of the Convention proper, provided in Article 94,
has been subjected to continuous study with a view to revision. The
United States apparently initiated this movement during the Pro-
visional Organization's life.82 The principal change originally advo-
cated contemplated a distinction found in many recent conventions.
between amendments involving new obligations for states and those
which do not; the former would require ratification to be effective and
the latter would be valid when adopted by a two-thirds vote of the
Assembly after a determination by. a similar vote of that body that no
new obligations were involved. The Convention was also to be altered
to permit a two year suspension period prior to the automatic termina-
tion of Convention commitments as the penalty for failure to ratify
amendments deemed to require uniform adoption.8 3
82 ICAO, Fourth Meeting, Committee on the Convention, Feb. 24, 1947, PICAO
Doc. No. 2913-IC/4.
83 ICAO, Text of a Proposed Amendment to Article 94 of the Chicago Con-
vention, ICAO Doc. No. 4039, A1-CP/12 at 29.
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Subsequent committee discussions revolved around two other sug-
gested changes of a subsidiary nature; that a state differing with the
Assembly's decision regarding the effect of the amendment on its exist-
ing obligations should be accorded "something in the nature of an
appeal" to the International Court of Justice, and that the amendments
depriving a state of existing rights, as well as those imposing new
obligations, would be effective only if ratified also. 4 Objections were
raised in these discussions to the constitutional difficulties encountered
by some states in accepting amendments imposed without ratification,
presumably even such amendments not altering the rights or obliga-
tions of a state. The United States, which on other occasions has
advocated this procedure in regard to amendments not altering the
obligations of a state, questioned the acceptability, unless provision for
appeal to the International Court was included.85
The British delegation suggested a different approach by advo-
cating that all amendments should be subject to ratification by two-
thirds of the contracting States, but that the action of this qualified
majority should bind all parties. This procedure has been adopted in
the United Nations Charter, and in the constitutions of the World
Health Organization and the International Labor Organization. Dis-
senting States would have the choice then of renouncing the Convention-
or accepting the authorized change.8 6
The first two Assemblies of the Organization held in 1947 and 1948
deferred action on the revision of the amendment procedure but
further study of Article 94 continued. The Legal Committee at its
Third Session in the Fall of 1948 was charged with the preparation of
two alternative draft articles for consideration by the Organization.
Both texts prepared by the Committee provide elaborately detailed
procedures, one text including nine subsections and the other eleven.
The first text incorporates the following principles: (1) amendments
initially will fall into two groups, those imposing new obligations or
depriving a state of existing rights and those which do not; the former
would require ratification by a qualified majority for validity and then
bind only ratifying states; the latter would come into force for all
contracting States after Assembly approval unless objected to within
60 days; objection would call for an appeal to the International Court
of Justice for an advisory opinion which would be accepted as con-
clusive determination of the effect of the amendment; (2) amendments
of the first type would be further subdivided by a decision of the
Assembly into two categories, those which are of such an essential
nature in relation to the Convention as to require acceptance by all
84 ICAO, Report Submitted to the Legal Comnittee by the Subcommittee on
the Amendment to Article 94 of the Chicago Convention, ICAO Doe. No. 5089,
LC/80, 19/1/48.
85 ICAO, Report to the Council by the Committee on the Convention on the
Report Submitted to the Legal Committee by the Subcommittee on Amendment
to Article 94, ICAO Doc. No. 5176, IC/509, 25/2/48.
86 Ibid.
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States and those which are not; in the former case failure to ratify
would be considered as "constructive denunciation" of the Convention
while in the latter case such failure would invoke no penalty.
The second text follows the British proposal: after Assembly
approval of an amendment, a period of six months would be provided
for dissents by contracting States; at the termination of this period, the
Assembly must again consider and approve the amendment before
opening it to ratification; ratification by at least two-thirds of the states
would be required to bring an amendment into force; amendments
receiving the requisite number of ratifications enter into force for
ratifying parties only, but failure to ratify within twelve months of the
effective date of an amendment is interpreted as denunciation of the
Convention, effective a year later.8 7
The Legal Committee's discussion of the above texts and its final
report evinced little enthusiasm for either revision.8 8 The first text
was deemed legally unacceptable unless the provision for amending the
Convention without state ratification was deleted. The iemoval of that
provision would leave the suggested text with little to recommend it
over the present. Convention article. In support of its position, the
Committee pointed out that it was contrary to the constitutional law
of most states to recognize the validity of amendments which they had
not ratified. No reference was made to the several international con-
ventions which provide for amendment by this procedure.
The Committee also noted that appeal to the International Court
for an advisory opinion as to the effect of an amendment on prior rights
and obligations of states would place the Court in a difficult situation
if called upon to overrule the conclusions of a sovereign state. In the
discussion it was asserted that an advisory opinion would'obligate
neither the State nor the Organization requesting it. The appeal pro-
cedure here involved is novel but there would appear to be no legal
objection to states and organizations committing themselves in advance
to give binding effect to an advisory opinion and two recent conventions
have so provided.8 9 Moreover, it has been pointed out that the "law of
treaties and the interpretation of treaties is by far the largest subject
87 ICAO, Summary of the Work of the Legal Committee During Its Third
Session, Lisbon, 1948. ICAO Doc. No. 6021, CL/118, Oct. 1, 1948. The texts of
the two proposals appear in Annex C to this Report as Appendices A and B.
88 Id., Annex C; Minutes of 8th, 9th and 10th Meetings of the Legal Com-
mittee, Third Session, Lisbon, Sept. 29 and 30, 1948; LC/ Working Draft, Nos. 28,
29, 30 respectively.
89 See for example General Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the United Nations (U.N. Doc. No. A/43, Feb. 9, 1946), which provides that the
advisory opinion of the Court shall be accepted as binding on the parties. Article
37(2) of the present I.L.O. constitution authorizes the Governing Body of the
Organization to provide for the appointment of a tribunal for the expeditious
settlement of disputes relating to Convention interpretation and further states
that "any applicable judgment or advisory opinion of the International Court of
Justice shall be binding" upon such a tribunal. (Emphasis supplied.) The Havana
Charter for an International Trade Organization provides for reference to the
International Court for advisory opinion in any discussion or request of a State
Charter, C. XIII, Art. 96 and Annex N, supra note 76.
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in the Court's jurisdiction."9 0 The Committee considered the second
text suggested by the British delegation which offered a choice between
ratification and constructive denunciation in all amendments less flex-
ible than the present procedure, which leaves this decision to the
Assembly to be determined as each case arises.
The Committee concluded that the result to be achieved by either
revision would not justify the effort or risks involved, for the amend-
ment of Article 93 itself, under the present procedure, might lead to
reduction of contracting parties or inconsistent obligations. It sug-
gested as preferable the determination of the conditions under which
the present Article 94 should be applied, the submission of these condi-
tions to member States, and the application of the automatic denuncia-
tion procedure only when really essential.
SUGGESTED CHANGES IN ARTICLE 94
The procedures for amending multipartite treaties of the last cen-
tury tend to fall roughly into three general patterns. Carrying over
the principles accepted in earlier bargaining treaties to law-making
agreements, changes in convention commitments of any of the parties
could be achieved only by the unanimous agreement of all of the
parties. This oldest and obviously restrictive technique accorded to
each state what has been termed "the liberum veto" whereby the action
of one dissenting state could block all revisions. The inflexibility of
this procedure inevitably led to its gradual abandonment and the
development of two alternative approaches. Perhaps the most common
amendment pattern today permits the alteration of treaty obligations
on ratification by a qualified majority of participating states, with such
alterations obligatory only for ratifying or consenting states. A third
procedure, probably less widely accepted because of its theoretical
impact on the independence of states, establishes machinery for effect-
ing revision of the convention by less than a unanimous agreement of
the parties, with such revisions assuming obligatory force for all of the
parties. Under this last procedure, recognition is often accorded to the
doctrine that a state's rights and obligations may not be altered without
its contemporaneous consent by inserting in the convention withdrawal
or renunciation provisions available to a dissenting state. The consti-
tutions of organizations born subsequent to World War II have fre-
quently resorted to a combination of these various patterns in recogni-
tion of the differing substantive character of changes which may be
necessitated.
The Legal Committee's conclusions regarding revision of Article
94 succinctly pose the basic difficulty inherent in the last two amend-
ment techniques -the maintenance of uniform international air law
enacted in the Convention among all contracting States, without sacri-
00 M. 0. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, 1920-42,
631 (1943).
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ficing the equally if not more important objective of universal adher-
ence to the Convention throughout the world community. The incom-
patibility which may exist between the two goals of uniform application
and universal participation springs from the reluctance of states, as
previously noted, to confer upon international institutions power to
impose subsequent obligations without their contemporaneous consent.
The institutional defects which result from this reluctance has been
deemed to reflect realistically the fundamental character of the inter-
national community today, founded on the sovereignty or independence
of its component parts.
While it is an accepted legal tenet that no state may be forced to
enter into an agreement to which it has not consented; it. is question-
able whether this principle can be advanced to support the thesis that
a state may not voluntarily enter into an agreement to be bound in the
future by obligations legislated by a majority of the states. While the
necessity of initial consent to a treaty conferring such law-making power
on an institution is admitted, no violation of state sovereignty occurs
because of the "continuing effect of the original agreement which is an
integral element in the authority of each subsequent decision." 91 What-
ever genuine legal limitations may exist in the national constitutional
law of some states, the doctrine of sovereignty alone cannot be logically
advanced as a legal obstacle to international legislation by this method.92
The formation of such an original agreement committing states to
accept subsequent changes to which they do not contemporaneously
consent has occurred in the past more frequently in fields of interna-
tional activity which do not directly affect the more vital political or
economic interests of states. However, the two principal political
associations of the twentieth century, the League and the United Na-
tions, adopted this procedure. This amendment technique has been
made palatable to the great powers in most instances by according
to them special prerogatives such as a veto right or a greater number
of votes. It is apparent also that states have resorted to this procedure
in fields of activity in which a substantial community of interest exists
among them and the need for interstate cooperation is sufficiently
obvious to make withdrawal or renunciation a theoretical rather than
a practical alternative. When such need exists and desire for coopera-
91 P. B. POTTER, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 191 (5th ed. 1948).
92 It has been frequently pointed out that voting procedures correlate directly
with practical matters of control and management rather than any dictating
theory. W. Koo, JR., VOTING PROCEDURES IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
(147); N. L. Hill, Unanimous Consent in International Organization 22 Am. J.
Int. L. 320 (1928). C. C. Hyde, 2 Int'l Law 1383 (2d rev. ed. 1947): "An independ-
ent State possesses the capacity to enter into international agreements that cover
a vast field of action pertaining to objectives that are of infinite variety. Such a
State may, however, formally resolve through the medium of a constitution not
to avail itself of the full measure of its capacity to contract and so strive to
prevent itself from agreeing to accept classes of undesired undertakings."
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tion becomes strongly manifest, reduction in membership will not
present a serious threat to the convention.9 3
Assuming the resolution of the primary problem in acceptance of
amendments supported by a majority, namely the initial consent of
states to such a treaty provision 9 4 there would seem to be an inherent
advantage in endowing international organizations such as ICAO with
legislative power of this character. Law-making by a majority in
national deliberative bodies has generally been recognized as the most
effective means for harmonizing government with the mutable needs
of society. Moreover, it has been pointed out that failure to consent to
many convention amendments frequently does not imply objection to
the bargain as often as it suggests negligence or disinterest. Provisions
permitting a majority of the contracting parties to effect changes not
obligatory on the minority offers no adequate substitute, for such
changes under modern world conditions may be relatively pointless
unless universally applied.
The present amendment procedure of the Chicago convention
places a double burden on the Assembly by requiring determination
not only of the merits of the contemplated change but further assess-
ment as to whether it should be considered as sufficiently important to
require uniform application, with the continuous threat of reducing
state participation. This aspect of the present article may inevitably
lead to a reluctance to foster any major change, however desirable, or
the dissolution of the Convention into several subsidiary agreements.
In contrast, a procedure for changing the rights and obligations of all
by approval of a qualified majority affords a clearer opportunity for
weighing the amendment on its merits.
It may be suggested also that reference to constructive denunciation
arising from failure to ratify an amendment could be advantageously
deleted from the amendment article. The right to reject new rules of
law is secured to states through the general denunciation provisions of,
Article 95 of the Convention. The requirement that a state must resort
to the positive and relatively drastic act of renouncing the entire Con-
vention to avoid a comparatively small change in its obligations and
rights may serve as a deterrent to loss of membership in most cases.
Moreover, the burden of terminating Convention commitments then
rests with the dissenting state rather than with the Organization.
Special consideration might have to be accorded larger powers
before such a change would receive substantial support. The Interna-
113 The experiences of the Universal Postal Union would seem to substantiate
this conclusion. Although 18 states withdrew from the League between 1920 and
1942, none of these was a result of the application of the amendment procedure
of Article 26 of the Covenant.
94 The desire of states to maintain as wide a control over future situations
as circumstances will permit leads to a basic reluctance to commit themselves to
future obligations which might be carried by a majority to which they would be
bound to submit. Hill, supra note 92.
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tional Labor Organization's amended Constitution, which calls for
ratification of amendments by five of the eight major powers as well as
a majority of the membership, seems to offer a more equitable approach
in this regard than according a veto power to particular states. Although
it is apparent that international law is dependent for its ultimate
effectiveness on the will of states, the advantages of machinery suffi-
ciently progressive to permit uniform changes of a vital character in
a dynamic field such as international aviation should not be under-
estimated.
CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFICULTIES IN AMENDING ARTICLE 94
The second World War thrust the mantle of international leader-
ship upon the United States and its primary position is nowhere more
evident than in the realm of aviation. This new responsibility would
seem to involve serious consideration of all cfforts leading toward more
effective inter-state organization and it has been suggested herein that
the amendment of Article 94 of the Chicago Convention may be one
means of realizing this objective. It is vigorously contended, however,
that constitutional limitations of many states, especially the United
States, prohibit the endowment of international institutions with power
to amend the basic agreement without the contemporaneous consent of
all participating states. Pre-war surveys of national constitutions reveal
that in many the treaty-making function of the state is dispersed between
the executive and legislative branches of the government.95 The rise of
representative government has led to a democratization of the treaty-
making procedure by requiring that international engagements may be
entered into only with legislative approval. Such a procedural require-
ment, however, does not necessarily indicate that the municipal agency
by which a treaty is ratified may not consent in the agreement to forego
its right to pass on subsequent changes in the instrument, or, in essence,
delegate its authority to the organization membership acting as a
majority. The extensive participation of modern states in certain
treaties herein discussed, which provide for amendment by agreement
of less than the total membership, would indicate that no-serious con-
stitutional obstacle exists in the national law of most states.
The Constitution of the United States has often been construed to
restrict this nation from negotiating any treaty which binds it to accept
in advance additional obligations which it does not subsequently ap-
prove - approval including Senate authorization. Article II, Section 2
of the Constitution suggests the basis of this position, for it accords to
the Senate authority to advise and consent to treaties negotiated by
the President as a prerequisite to their conclusion. The crux of the
argument is that the Constitution invalidates any conferral of treaty-
95 RALPH ARNOLD, TREATY-MAKING PROCEDURE (1933); S. B. CRANDALL,
TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT (1904).
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making authority on an agency which under the Constitution devolves
upon the Senate.96
Although the Constitution fails to specify any other means of con-
cluding international engagements by the federal government, 7 a par-
allel practice. has been pursued by the executive, since the. advent of
the Constitution, of entering into agreements with or without the
approbation of the entire Congress." An examination of post-war
agencies referred to herein reveals that in all but two cases United States
participation was not effected by the treaty-making process:
Organization and Date
of Instrument
1. UNRRA, Nov. 9, 1943
2. FAO, August 1, 1944
3. ICAO, Dec. 7, 1944
4. UNO, June 28, 1945
5. IMF and IBRD (Mone-
tary Fund & Bank),
Dec. 22, 1944
6. UNESCO, Nov. 16, 1945
7. IRO, Constitution ap-
proved by UNO, Dec.
15, 1946
8. WHO, July 22, 1946
9. ITO, Mar. 24, 1948
Form of Instrument and
Date of U.S. Participation Legislative Action99
Executive Agreement; ef-
fective Nov. 9, 1943
Executive Agreement;
Signed by U.S. October
16, 1945
Treaty; Ratif. Aug. 6,1946




by U.S. Dec. 20, 1945;
signed Dec. 27, 1945.
Executive Agreement; In-
strument of Acceptance
deposited Sept. 30, 1946
Executive Agreement; In-
strument of Acceptance




by U.S., June 14, 1948
Transmitted to the Con-




approval by joint reso-
l u t ion appropriating






by Senate, July 25, 1946
Ratification recommended






olution, July 30, 1946
Membership authorized by





The United States membership in the Universal Postal Union has al-
ways occurred through executive agreement "ratified and approved" by
the Postmaster General and "approved" by the President under power
96 See for example Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on
the General Arbitration Treaties of 1911, S.Ex. Rep. No. 1, Sixty-Second Con-
gress, 1st Sess., 30 Senate Documents, No. 98 at 6 (1911).
97 Article I, Section 10, refers indirectly to international engagements other
than treaties: "No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, . . . enter
into any Agreement or Compact with another State or with a foreign Power....
9
sSee WALLACE MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS (1941).
99 UNRRA, 58 Stat. 122 (1944) ; FAO, 59 Stat. 529 (1945) ; ICAO, 92 Cong.
Rec. 9972 (1946); UNO, 59 Stat. 1033 (1945); IMF, IBRD, 59 Stat. 512 (1945);
UNESCO, 60 Stat. 712 (1946); IRO, 61 Stat. 214 (1947); WHO, P.L. 842, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess. (June 14, 1948) ; Executive referral of ITO agreement to Congress
appears in Dep't. State Bull. May 8, 1949, at 601.
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conferred by Congress authorizing such agreements and "treaties." 100
The same law provides the basis for participation in the Postal Union
for the Americas and Spain. The United States joined the ILO in 1934
after Congress, by joint resolution, authorized the President to accept
membership,101 and this action was reaffirmed in 1947 by joint resolu-
tion approving its revised constitution.102
In a majority of the joint resolutions of Congress providing for
United States participation, a section has been carefully inserted to
provide that the President or any agent of the United States shall not
accept any amendments to the constitution on behalf of the United
States which impose new obligations for this country "unless Congress
by law authorizes such action." Such a provision appears in the resolu-
tions providing for membership in the International Bank, the Mone-
tary Fund, FAO and UNESCO. The UNRRA appropriation, which
followed signature and participation by Presidential act alone, included
notice to contracting parties that "no amendment under Article VIII
(a) ...involving new obligations for the United States" would be
binding without approval by joint resolution of Congress. Section
VIII (a), embraced amendments involving new obligations for mem-
bers which were effective for each member only on acceptance by it.
Sections (b), and (c) of the same article covered amendments not add-
ing to states' obligations and were obligatory for all participants on
adoption by a qualified majority vote of the plenary body in most
instances. It is significant that UNESCO, FAO, IRO, the International
Bank and Monetary Fund all permit amendment of their Constitutions
by majority approval in matters not imposing additional burdens on
states and that, as in the case of the UNRRA authorization, no reference
is made in the respective joint resolutions to this aspect of the amend-
ment procedures. The Congressional restraint on executive action
appearing in these resolutions raises the question as to what agency
of the state may be authorized to effect changes in the terms of agree-
ments and suggests that Congress has by practice taken unto itself
a fundamental role in effecting such agreements, which it is reluctant
to abandon. 03 These expressions of legislative restraint obviously do
not constitute reservations to the agreements, for the Conventions
specify that state approval of amendments is a prerequisite to the
imposition of obligations in such cases. However, the omission of any
100 25 Statutes 654 (1889). Original participation of the United States in
the Universal Postal Union was authorized by Act of 1872, 17 Stat. 283; Section
167 read: "that for the purpose of making better postal arrangements with foreign
countries ... the Post-Master, by and with the advice of the President, may
negotiate and conclude postal treaties and conventions ... "
101 49 Stat. 1182 (1934) ; also U.S. Treaty Series, No. 874 (1934).
102 P.L. 843, 80th Cong., 2d. Sess. (June 30, 1948).
103 Since the Constitution does not provide directly for Congressional partici-
pation in effecting international agreements, it may be argued that the legislature
in such cases has no power to delegate. The basis for Congressional action has
been deemed an extra-constitutional usage, sanctioned by the courts on many oc-
casions. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); The Brig Aurora, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 382 (1913).
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reference to the sections of the above Constitutions providing for
obligatory changes in the instruments authorized by the majority, if
such changes do not alter state obligations, would imply that Congress
has acquiesced to subsequent amendments of a minor nature without
requiring its contemporaneous consent.
United States participation in some post-war agencies merits further
consideration, for the constitutions of some of these institutions call
for the passage of all amendments by less than unanimous ratification
or approval. The United Nations Charter is not relevant to the prob-
lem of delegation of treaty-making functions, for the United States is
obviously protected by the veto from accepting subsequent changes of
which it does not approve. 'Since the veto is reserved to the permanent
members of the Security Council only, it seems apparent that many
states consider the legislative role in writing a treaty a delegatable one.
The 1934 Congressional resolution authorizing membership in the
International Labor Organization does not refer to the amendment
provisions of that Constitution.'" The joint resolution authorizing
membership in the World Health Organization, which also provides
for obligatory amendments effected by the majority, suggests that with-
drawal provisions may be deemed adequate protection against the im-
position of additional obligations which the United States does not
support. The resolution notes the absence of a withdrawal article in
the WHO Constitution and reserves to the United States the right to
take such action after notice. No reference to the amendment pro-
cedure appears in the law.
The executive agreement accompanied by Congressional action
has become by custom and usage a recognized channel for conducting
foreign relations, approximating in national law the stature of a
treaty.10 5 Some of the above agreements would prompt the conclusion
that Congress considers its legislative role in some-instances as subject
to delegation to an external agency such as an inter-state institution.
Moreover, the Supreme Court in the Curtis-Wright decision indicated
that it would hesitate to condemn such a practice: 10 6
" ...it is evident that this court should not be in haste to apply a
general rule which will have the effect of condemning legislation like
that under review as constituting an unlawful delegation of legislative
power."
In contrast to the method by which the United States has partici-
pated in other specialized agencies of recent creation, the Chicago Con-
104 The joint resolution of 1934 carefully specified that no obligations under
the Covenant of the League were assumed by the United States accepting member-
ship in the ILO. It further stated that "special provision has been made in the
constitution . .. by which membership of the United States would not impose or
be deemed to impose any obligation . . upon the United States to accept the pro-
posals of that body as involving anything more than recommendations for its con-
sideration." This statement apparently refers only to the status of conventions
prepared by the Organization and submitted to states for voluntary action.
1o5 U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
106 U.S. v. Curtis Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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vention was submitted to the Senate as a treaty and approved by that
body. Unlike most of the conventions, it includes not only on interna-
tional constitution but the basic principles of international air law.
Its amendment procedure may therefore pose a slightly more difficult
problem under the constitutional doctrine of the United States., It
would seem questionable, however, that the problem of delegating the
treaty-making function of the Senate differs basically in theory from
that presented by Congress delegating its role in the making of execu-
tive agreements. 10 7 Recent decisions of the Supreme Court evidence a
tendency to regard the choice of the methods or the agency by which.
foreign relations are conducted as involving political issues to be deter-
mined by the legislative and executive departments rather than the
courts. 08 The ultimate responsibility for determining what treaty
powers may be conferred on an international body may thus rest with
the Senate and the executive. The reluctance of the Senate to enter into
international engagements providing for amendment according to ma-
jority will perhaps present the most serious obstacle to United States'
approval. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, ratified
by the United States in December 1947,109 manifests a recognition of
the desirability of vesting substantial power in international institu-
tions. The treaty calls for the application of political and economic
sanctions against an aggressor if two-thirds of the Contracting Parties
agree to such measures. The constitutionality and expediency of a
treaty commitment are frequently confused. If the utility of flexible
procedures for change are sufficiently apparent, it seems doubtful that
constitutional difficulties prohibit their authorization.
107 Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
108 U.S. v. Curtis-Wright Corp., 209 U.S. 304 (1937); U.S. v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324 (1937); U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); Chicago and So. Air Lines
v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 45 (1948). The different origin and
essential character of the power over external affairs of the federal government
suggests that different standards of constitutionality may be applicable.
109 18 Dep't. State Bull., 60.
